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ABSTRACT
A substantial volume o f  research (e.g., Charrow & Charrow, 1979; Elwork, Sales, 
& Alfini, 1977, 1982) suggests that jurors do not understand the often-convoluted 
language o f  standard jury instructions. Some states have recently simplified their 
instructions, but others continue to debate whether change is beneficial. This study was 
designed to investigate whether “plain language” jury instructions lead to improved 
comprehension. College students listened to either new, plain language Minnesota jury 
instructions or older Minnesota jury instructions addressing the same topics. Participants 
then took a written comprehension test covering legal rules contained in the instructions. 
Participants also completed a Nelson-Denny vocabulary' test (Brown, Bennett, & Hanna, 
1981) and provided demographic information. No significant treatment group differences 
were found for overall comprehension scores. Vocabulary scores were significantly 
correlated with comprehension scores for both groups o f subjects. The results suggest 
that a juror’s verbal proficiency is more important in predicting comprehension o f  jury' 
instructions than the language style o f  the instructions. Also, response patterns for some 
items suggest that people often maintain preconceived notions o f legal rules despite clear 
instruction to the contrary.
viii
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The past few decades have seen a call for greater accountability o f  public and 
private institutions, including government, professions, and private business, along with a 
corresponding recognition o f  citizens’ “right to understand” (Danet, 1990). These 
concerns have given rise to the “plain English” or “plain language” movement with respect 
to legal documents (Charrow & Charrow, 1979; Elwork, Sales & Alfini, 1982). Redish 
(1985) offers this definition o f  plain English:
Plain English means writing that is straightforward, that reads as if it were spoken. 
It means writing that is unadorned with archaic, multisyllabic words and majestic 
turns o f phrase that even educated readers cannot understand. Plain English is 
clear, direct, and simple, (p. 125)
Numerous state and federal laws now require that warranties, consumer contracts, 
insurance policies and loan agreements be written in language understandable to the 
average person (e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. sec. 325G.31 (Minnesota plain language contract 
act); 15 U.S.C. sec. 2302 (1996) (Magnuson-Moss warranty act)). (For a discussion o f  
such legislation, see Charrow and Charrow, 1979, and Park and Harvey, 1985.) The 
simplification o f  wording and sentence structure in bank loans, sales agreements and 
mortgages has lead to improved comprehension in experimental settings (Masson & 
Waldron, 1994).
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The Nature o f Jury Instructions
One critical setting in which legal language should be understandable to laypersons 
is the courtroom. Of particular concern is jury instructions —  instructions on the law 
given by the judge to the jury during a trial. Several scholars (e g., Elwork, et al., 1982) 
have charged that jurors’ pervasive misunderstanding o f jury instructions can lead to 
lawless verdicts.
In a jury trial, it is the juiy’s job to determine the facts, in other words, to sort out 
which parts of the competing stories presented at trial are the true ones, and to render a 
verdict by applying these factual decisions to the law (Elwork, et al., 1982).
It is judge’s job to determine the law applicable to the case and instruct the jury 
accordingly. Instructions provided by the judge to the jury during the course of trial are 
referred to as jury instructions, or the "charge" to the jury. Usually instructions are 
presented in two parts. The judge reads preliminary instructions, covering general duties 
applicable during the course o f trial, at the start of the trial. After all the evidence has 
been presented and the attorneys have made their closing arguments, the judge reads 
closing instructions, including the substantive law relating to the particular case at hand. 
The time required to present closing instructions can vary greatly, but twenty to thirty 
minutes is fairly typical (Meyer & Rosenberg, 1971).
The Importance of Comprehension
The North Carolina Court of Appeals described the function of jury instructions:
The chief purpose o f the charge is to aid the juiy in clearly understanding the case
and in arriving at a correct verdict. If this is not done, there can be no assuranc
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that the verdict represents a finding by the jury under the law and upon the 
evidence presented. (Warren v Parks. 1977, 31 N.C.App. at p. 612; 230 S.E.2d 
at p. 687 (citations omitted))
If jurors don't understand the instructions, they may fall back on previous, often 
erroneous, notions of the law (Park, 1999). Ellsworth (1989) observed that mock jurors 
frequently deliberated about topics the judge had previously ruled to be irrelevant. She 
concluded that "juries rely at least as much on legal knowledge gained outside the 
courtroom as they are [sic] on the judge's instructions" (p. 221). Severance, Greene & 
Loftus (1984) noted that “if instructions are not understandable, verdicts will tend to be 
based on idiosyncratic features of the trial or personal attitudes of the jurors rather than on 
the proper legal standards” (p. 220).
Elwork, et al. (1982) identified features typical of juries that don’t understand their 
instructions. The researchers presented participants with a videotaped automobile 
accident trial, followed by one of two different versions of jury instructions. Through 
comprehension tests, one version was identified as being less comprehensible than the 
other. The researchers found that the jurors receiving less comprehensible instructions 
exhibited several characteristics: (a) Deliberations were more likely to be dominated by 
one person or a few people claiming to have legal expertise, (b) the jury was more likely 
to discuss improper topics such as insurance in an injury case, and (c) jurors were more 
likely to reach incorrect verdicts (“incorrect” being defined as a verdict inconsistent with 
the jurors’ conclusions about the facts). In other words, jurors receiving hard-to- 
understand instructions were incorrectly applying the law to the facts as they found them.
4
Generally, judges are prohibited from commenting on the evidence, or stating an 
opinion as to how the jury should render its verdict (Steele & Thornburg, 1988). Thus, 
judges are very reluctant to answer questions from jurors for fear that the answer might be 
viewed as a comment on the evidence. Accordingly, when juries ask for help interpreting 
the instructions, their questions are usually met with no comment, an admonition to review 
the instructions, or simply a re-reading of the relevant instructions by the judge in exactly 
the same wording as before (Severance & Loftus, 1982). This is or  little help to jurors 
(Ellsworth, 1989). This pattern exists, notwithstanding that when jurors ask for help with 
the instructions, the trial judge is obligated to offer additional instruction or explanation 
that would guide the jury (Bollenbach v. United States. 1946; Writdtt v. United States. 
1957).
The law generally prohibits inquiry into the method or reasoning by which a jury 
reaches its verdict (Meyer & Rosenberg (1971); Steele & Thornburg, 1988; see, e g., Fed. 
R. Evid. 606(b)). Thus, most real-world juror misunderstanding is impossible to identify 
or confirm. A few jurisdictions, however, allow information about deliberations to 
become public. As a result, cases exist in which juror misunderstanding of legal issues is 
known to have affected the verdicts.
In Sellars v. United States (1979), the defendant was charged with the murder of 
an acquaintance. He plead not guilty, claiming self-defense. At the end o f the evidence, 
the jury listened to an hour and a half o f jury instructions and deliberated overnight. The 
jury found the defendant guilty of manslaughter, a lesser offense than the original charge 
of second degree murder. Shortly after the trial, while speaking among themselves.
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several jurors realized that they had meant to find the defendant not guilty, but had 
misunderstood the instructions. They had mistakenly thought that if they accepted his 
self-defense claim, manslaughter was the appropriate verdict. Nevertheless, neither the 
trial judge nor the appellate court would allow the verdict to be changed. The conviction 
was affirmed. (See Elwork, et ai„ 1982, for background facts of this case.)
In 1982 Luis Marin was charged with intentionally setting a fire that killed twenty- 
six people. The prosecution argued that Marin had intended to set a small fire so he could 
emerge as a hero. Co-workers testified that Marin had disappeared from the site just 
before the fire began. All evidence against Marin was circumstantial. During the jury’s 
deliberation, they asked the judge to clarify the meaning of “intent.” Eventually, the jury 
found Marin guilty. The judge, however, overturned the verdict on the grounds that 
because the prosecution’s case failed to negate other explanations for the fire, the 
evidence was insufficient to support a conviction (Severance, et al., 1984).
In Whited v. Powell (1956) some jurors mistakenly believed that liability required 
deliberate misconduct, and voted accordingly. The court held that this was “express 
misconstruction of the court’s charge” (155 Tex. at p. 215; 285 S W.2d at p. 364) but 
refused to order a new trial. The court reasoned that jury verdicts would be of little value 
if misunderstanding by jurors constituted grounds for a new trial.
In Compton v. Henrie (1963), one juror repeatedly told the rest of the jury that 
“preponderance of the evidence” was the same as “reasonable doubt,” so that the 
defendant could not be found liable unless his “guilt” was proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The court held that the juror’s statements amounted to “nothing more than a
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misinterpretation of the court’s charge; and were, consequently, not misconduct” (p. i 84). 
The verdict was affirmed.
In Hoffman v. Deck Masters. Inc. (1983), the jury miscalculated damages because 
it misunderstood the jury instructions. Despite affidavits from eight jurors establishing 
that they failed to understand the charge, the court ruled that misconstruction of the 
charge did not justify a new trial. The verdict was allowed to stand.
These and numerous other cases illustrate the prevalence of juror 
misunderstanding of instructions and judicial reluctance to interfere or allow a new trial on 
that basis (Steele & Thornburg, 1988). It is apparent that miscomprehension of jury 
instructions has had an impact on verdicts in actual cases, both civil and criminal.
Pattern Instructions Developed
Error in instructing the jury is often cited as the single most frequent cause for 
appeal and reversal of a case (Sales, Elwork, & Alfini, 1977). Seemingly minor changes 
from established wording may result in reversal and the need for a retrial. For example, in 
People v. Garcia (1975), the California Court of Appeal discussed seven prior cases in 
which trial courts had attempted to explain “reasonable doubt” beyond the language 
established in an early case. Each attempt was ruled to be legally erroneous.
The conflict between legal precision and juror understanding has long frustrated 
jurists, as expressed by Jerome Frank seven decades ago:
What a crop of subsidiary semi-myths and mythical practices the jury system 
yields! Time and money and lives are consumed in debating the precise words 
which the judge may address to the jury, although everyone who stops to see and
6
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think knows that these words might as well be spoken in a foreign language — 
that, indeed, for all the jury’s understanding of them, they are spoken in a foreign 
language. Yet, every day, cases which have taken weeks to try are reversed by 
upper courts because a phrase or sentence, meaningless to the jury, has been 
included in, or omitted from the judge’s charge. (Frank, 1930, p. 181) 
Recognizing the importance of accurate jury instructions, and the difficult task of 
trial judges in formulating such instructions for each trial, most jurisdictions in the United 
States have developed pattern jury instructions. Pattern instructions are statements of the 
law written by committees of judges and lawyers for presentation to jurors at trial. 
Depending on the needs of the case, the trial judge selects the particular instiuctions for 
use at trial (Charrow & Charrow, 1979).
In drafting pattern instnictions, priority has been given to creating legally accurate 
statements of the law, rather than creating comprehensible instructions. This priority is 
made clear by the following admonition found in an early version of jury instructions from 
California: "The one thing an instruction must do above all else is correctly state the law. 
This is true regardless of who is capable of understanding it" (California Jury Instructions 
— Criminal: Book of Approved Jury Instructions (BAJI) 44 (1950) (cited in Severance, 
et al„ 1984)).
In an effort to be legally accurate in creating jury instructions, drafting committees 
often adopt language from statutes or case law: language written by and intended for use 
by judges and attorneys, not laypersons. And because jury instructions are intended to 
cover all cases, they often contain vague generalities or too-numerous specifics that impair
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comprehension and apply poorly to any particular case (Severance, et al., 1984). It is not 
surprising, then, that numerous studies have found very low comprehension rates for 
material in pattern jury instructions 
Studies Testing Pattern Instructions
Using a mock trial scenario, Elwork, Sales, and Alfini (1977) found that the 
presentation o f pattern Michigan negligence instructions resulted in no better 
understanding of the applicable law than the presentation of no instructions at all. The 
authors posited that the average juror may understand only half of the legal instructions 
presented by the judge (Elwork, et al., 1982).
Reifman, Gusick & Ellsworth (1992) compared former jurors with people who had 
been called for jury duty but who had not yet served. Each group was administered an 
objective test covering legal rules that the former jurors had heard at trial. The former 
jurors performed better than the non-jurors, but comprehension was still very low. The 
authors concluded that jurors understand less than half o f the instructions they hear at 
trial.
In another study (Ellsworth, 1989) participants watched a videotaped mock 
homicide trial, received jury instructions, deliberated, and then filled out an objective test 
covering legal rules contained in the instructions. Ellsworth found that although 
participants spent over 20% of their deliberation time discussing the law, only about half 
o f their law-related statements were correct, and one fifth were, according to Reifman, et 
al. (1992), “seriously in error” (p. 540). On the 18-item objective test, participants' 
average score was 11.7, not significantly different from random guessing.
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O'Reilly (1976) sent a questionnaire to former jurors who had served on civil 
juries. The questionnaire included 10 multiple-choice items testing the definitions of basic 
legal concepts that should have been familiar to the jurors. Using 80% as a minimum 
passing score, O'Reilly found a 37% failure rate. The most problematic areas were the 
definitions of "preponderance of the evidence" (44% error rate), "admissible evidence" 
(32%), and “inference” (31%). The best-performing concepts were "weigh evidence" (8% 
error rate) and "evidence" (9%).
O’Mara and von Eckartsberg (1977) also surveyed former jurors. The researchers 
found that 76% of the respondents lacked a full understanding of their role as jurors, and 
3% demonstrated a total lack of comprehension. Also, jurors tended to overestimate their 
level of comprehension: 83% were “quite certain” or “completely certain” of their 
responses, but significant misunderstanding was found for key legal concepts such as 
“legal cause” (32% error rate) and “ordinary care” (29%).
Forston (1975) presented a civil or criminal mock case to experienced former 
jurors, followed by a multiple-choice comprehension test of the jury instructions. He 
found that participants viewing the civil case scored only 46% correct prior to 
deliberation, and 60.1% after deliberation. Participants viewing the criminal case scored 
only 53.1% before deliberation, and 63.3% afterwards. A pilot study using college 
students had resulted in higher scores, but Forston warned that the former jurors, rather 
than the students, were more representative of actual jurors.
Strawn and Buchanan (1976) compared instructed and non-instructed participants 
in a mock burglary trial scenario. The instructed participants received pattern Florida jury
10
instructions. On a 40-item objective test, the instructed jurors barely outperformed the 
non-instructed jurors (30% vs. 40% error rate overall), and failed to show any 
improvement over non-instructed jurors on four out of nine important subject areas 
("reasonable doubt,” "information," "material allegation," and "breaking and entering"). In 
fact, the instructed jurors showed lower understanding on some items (including 
"demeanor" and "reasonable doubt"), indicating that pattern instructions were producing 
confusion, rather than comprehension.
In a similar study, Buchanan, Pryor, Taylor, and Strawn (1978) compared 
instructed and non-instructed participants using a comprehension test designed to assess 
their understanding of Florida pattern instructions on breaking and entering, The authors 
found that instructed participants generally performed better than non-instructed 
pa.ticipants, however, the instructed group scored only 72% on overall comprehension 
and 40% on questions requiring the application of jury instructions to hypothetical trial 
situations. The researchers noted:
The low rates of comprehension demonstrated in such areas as circumstantial 
evidence, presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, witness credibility, witness 
demeanor, admissable [sic] evidence, and what constitutes an attempt to commit a 
crime are particularly distressing when one considers the possible ramifications in 
jury deliberations. When viewed in light of the possibility that a verdict may not be 
reached if just one juror fails to understand a portion of the instructions, the 
pervasive misunderstanding indicated by the data has serious implications for both 
the fairness and efficiency of our jury system, (p. 35)
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Juror misunderstanding is widespread. Comprehension problems have been found
for pattern instructions from California (Charrow & Charrow, 1979; Ellsworth, 1989), 
Michigan (Elwork, et al., 1977; Reifman, et al., 1992), Florida (Strawn & Buchanan,
1976; Buchanan, et al., 1978; Elwork, et al., 1982), Iowa (Forston, 1975), Nevada 
(Elwork, et al., 1982), District of Columbia (O’Reilly, 1976), Missouri (Wiener, Pritchard, 
& Weston, 1995), Pennsylvania (O’Mara & von Eckartsberg, 1977), Arizona (Elwork, et 
al., 1982), Washington (Severance, et al., 1984; Severance & Loftus, 1982), and 
Wyoming (Saxton, 1998).
Psvcholinguistic Trouble Spots
In a landmark study, Charrow and Charrow (1979) tested comprehension of 14 
pattern California jury instructions typically used in traffic accident cases. Each participant 
listened to a tape recording of a single jury instruction and then attempted to recite or 
paraphrase the instruction back to the experimenter. (This is referred to as a paraphrase 
task.) Responses were recorded and transcribed. In analyzing the results, the researchers 
broke down each instruction into its most important idea units. A participant received one 
point for each idea unit correctly recalled. Across all 14 instructions, participants 
correctly recited only about half (54%) o f the important idea units.
Charrow and Charrow noted that the instructions contained numerous linguistic 
constructions that typically create comprehension difficulties. The authors also noted that 
participants' performance on these phrases was significantly lower than their overall 
performance, indicating that the participants were having particular difficulty 
understanding these phrases. Specifically, Charrow and Charrow identified the following
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problematic linguistic constructions common to most jury instructions:
A. Nominalization. Nominalization occurs when a word that normally functions 
as a verb has been turned into a noun, for example, “the doing o f’ instead of “we do,” or 
“the investigation o f’ instead of “we investigated.” Nominalizations are more difficult for 
a reader or listener to process than the corresponding verb forms for at least two reasons 
First, verb forms are believed to be more basic than most nouns, so that any procedure 
making a phrase less verb-like and more noun-like creates abstraction. Second, 
nominalization often removes the “doer” o f the action, for example, changing the phrase 
“when you incorporate material...” into the phrase “the incorporation of material...”, 
removes the subject “you.” This makes the statement vague, impersonal, and hard to 
reconstruct.
B. The prepositional phrase "as to". The phrase “as to” is designed to connect 
two concepts, but the nature of the link is ambiguous. An example would be, “You must 
not speculate as to what the answer would have been.” Charrow and Charrow noted that 
the phrase “as to” seems vague — not referring to time, location, or purpose — and thus, 
may serve as a signal to the listener that the subsequent material is unimportant. Charrow 
and Charrow recommended that in most situations, “as to” can be replaced with “about.”
C. Misplaced phrases. Often jury instructions contain phrases that break up 
continuity or create ambiguity within a sentence due to their poor placement. For 
example, “If, in these instructions, any rule, direction or idea is repeated ..." Charrow and 
Charrow noted that in most sentences, the word "if' is followed by the subject. Thus, 
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are repeated. ..” The authors recommended relocating prepositional phrases so that they 
do not break up clauses. In this example, the underlined clause might be relocated after 
the word “repeated.”
D. "Whiz" deletion. Omission of relative pronouns that link clauses together in 
subordinate clauses (for example, "which is," "that is," "who are") often leads to 
miscomprehension. This phenomenon is referred to as "whiz" (short for "which is") 
deletion. For example, the phrase, "If you are convinced it is erroneous..." is confusing, 
requiring the listener to backtrack and fill in missing information. By contrast, the phrase, 
"If you are convinced that it is erroneous..." is much more clear.
E. Lexical items (vocabulary). One of the most common and obvious problems 
with jury instructions is the use of legal terms or uncommon words. Examples include 
words like deem, credibility, stipulate, and proximate cause. These create obvious 
comprehension problems for laypersons. Imwinkelried and Schwed (1987) admonished, 
“the draftsman should not view the task of writing an instruction as an excuse for 
displaying the extent of technical vocabulary” (p. 138).
F. Multiple negatives. Examples of multiple negatives include, "not to avoid it," 
"without which the injury would not have occurred,” "innocent misrecollection is not 
uncommon.” Charrow and Charrow noted that negatives generally take longer to process 
and lead to more comprehension errors than positively worded equivalent phrases. With 
respect to the jury instructions under study, the researchers found that multiple negatives 
indeed lead to lower comprehension rates, although single negatives appeared to pose no 
problem.
13
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G. Passive voice. Passive voice is characteristic of most legal language.
Examples from jury instructions include, “no emphasis thereon is intended by me," or “the 
conduct reasonably could be avoided." These examples could be translated into active 
form: “I do not intend to emphasize...” or “the defendant could reasonably avoid the 
conduct.” Charrow and Charrow found that passive phrases, in general, were reasonably 
well understood by participants. However, location was key: When passive phrases were 
located in subordinate clauses, comprehension was significantly impaired. An example is 
the following: "You must never speculate to be true any insinuation suggested by a 
question asked a witness" (p. 1326, fn53).
H. Word lists (redundancy) Often legal language contains unnecessarily 
redundant word strings, for example, "give, bequeath, and devise." Charrow and Charrow 
found that participants were more likely to remember at least one of the list items if 
shorter lists were used. Using multiple items to express a single idea was 
counterproductive; participants were less likely to remember any items on the list. Thus, 
the researchers recommended limiting word lists to no more than two items.
I. Discourse structure. Charrow and Charrow found several examples of poor 
organization, including the failure to group ideas logically, the presence of confusing 
redundancy, and the lack of introductory material. In addition to organizing material into 
meaningful groups, the authors recommended that drafters of jury instructions avoid 
repeating the same information in a different form without explaining that it constitutes the 
same ideas. For example, one jury instruction listed the elements of a claim in paragraph 
form, then proceeded to present the same elements, reworded, in list form. This left some
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participants incorrectly believing that the second set of elements constituted new, even 
contradictory, information. Moreover, the authors recommended that before presenting a 
list o f items, an introductory remark be given to advise the jurors how many items are 
coming. For example, “There are four things the plaintiff must prove: First,....” This 
helps listeners remember the items or at least realize when their recollection is incomplete.
J. Embedded clauses. Embedded clauses involve the use of one or more 
subordinate clauses within one sentence. A particularly egregious example, containing 
three embeddings, is the following: “You must never speculate to be true any insinuation 
suggested bv a question asked a witness.’’ To minimize the mentd gymnastics required 
by such a sentence, Charrow and Charrow advised that embedded clauses be avoided, 
particularly ones that include whiz deletions and passive voice (such as the example 
immediately above). Instead, simple sentences with normal subject-verb-object word 
order should be used.
K, Modals. Modals are a class of verbs, including “must,”) “may,” “might,” 
“should,” “can,” and “could,” that communicate ability, obligation or permission. For 
example, “You must not be influenced by...” or “You should consider....” In contrast to 
most linguistic constructions discussed by Charrow and Charrow, modals were found to 
enhance comprehension. The authors speculated that jurors tune in to instructions that 
clearly tell them what to do.
Other recommendations. Elwork, et al. (1977 and 1982) identified other trouble 
spots often found injury instmctions and made the following recommendations:
1. Avoid uncommon words. For example, use the phrase “broke the law” instead
15
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of violated a statute.” Both “violated” and “statute” are relatively uncommon terms
2. Use parallel grammatical forms for lists (e g., introducing each item of a iist 
with the same word).
3. Use concrete words that are easily visualized (for example, “accident” instead 
of “occurrence”) or follow an abstract word with concrete example. Also, use parties’ 
names instead of the generic terms “plaintiff* and “defendant.”
4. Avoid homonyms — similar sounding words with more than one meaning. 
Examples include “court,” “bar,” and “information.” Homonyms can create confusion in 
the listener’s mind with respect to which meaning is intended
5. Avoid synonyms. The listener may assume that the use of different words 
implies different meanings.
6. Use positive antonyms instead of negative modifiers. For example, use 
“ignore” instead of “disregard.” Negative modifiers are believed to impair comprehension 
because they require two steps: comprehension of the positive version, then negation of 
it. Moreover, statements that tell jurors what not to do or what to avoid, by themselves, 
fail to provide guidance on what jurors should do. Unless it is important to emphasize 
what the jury is forbidden from doing, the authors recommend instructing them in positive 
terms.
7. Use humans as the subject o f sentences. The use of inanimates as the subject is 
more abstract and harder to process. Thus, avoid phrases such as “the law says...” 
because the law is abstract, and does not literally speak.
8. Avoid the use o f verbs that can take either transitive or intransitive forms. A
17
transitive verb indicates action flowing from the subject to the object. For example, in the 
sentence, “Mr. Jackson hit Ms. Martin,” “hit” is a transitive verb (Imwinkelried &
Schwed, 1987). By contrast, intransitive verbs do not require a direct object. Elwork, et 
al. (1982) described the problem:
Many verbs take on either form (e g., “If you believe the defendant” versus “If you 
believe the defendant to be guilty”). The latter have been shown to cause 
confusion in comprehension because the reader/listener may make a transitive 
interpretation initially and then has to change it to an intransitive one upon hearing 
the last part of the sentence. ,..[B]y adding the word “that” to the exemplary 
phrase above, we can avoid much o f the problem (e.g., “If you believe that the 
defendant is guilty. . .”), (p. 174)
9. Adopt logical organizational structure. The authors recommended using one or 
a combination o f three general organizational schemes: associational, hierarchical, or 
algorithmic. Associational structure involves grouping topics together that are connected 
by a common concept. For example, instructions explaining how a particular type of 
evidence should or should not be used, or instructions covering the conduct expected of 
jurors during deliberations, might be grouped together.
In a hierarchical structure, higher level concepts are broken down into their lower 
level components. For example, in defining “intent to murder,” the judge might first list its 
components: willfulness, premeditation, deliberation, and malice. Each of the 
components might then be further explained.
In an algorithmic structure, one concept builds on the other. This type of
18
organization is particularly useful when causal or temporal relations are being explained 
A typical use o f an algorithmic structure is an instruction that outlines, step-by-step, a 
series of decisions the jury must make in reaching its verdict.
(For a summary of the psycholinguistic concepts outlined by Charrow and 
Charrow (1979) and by Elwork, et al. (1977, 1982), see Imwinkelried and Schwed 
(1987)).
Studies Testing Simplified Instructions
As noted above, Charrow and Charrow (1979) used a paraphrase test to evaluate 
common California instructions. Low comprehension rates were found and many 
linguistic problems were identified. In the second part of their study, Charrow and 
Charrow rewrote each of the 14 jury instructions used in the first part, eliminating as many 
o f the linguistic problems as feasible. The revised instructions were tested for 
comprehension, again using the paraphrase task. The researchers found a 35% overall 
improvement when comparing the original pattern instructions to the newly-revised 
instructions. The greatest improvement in comprehension was seen for the instructions 
rated by attorneys as the most conceptually difficult. The researchers also analyzed 
comprehension for each type of linguistic problem. Improvement in comprehension 
ranged from 11% for eliminating or shortening unnecessary word lists, to 81% for 
eliminating passive phrases in subordinate clauses. Charrow and Charrow concluded that 
the pattern instructions used in the study were not well understood, that particular 
linguistic problems were largely responsible for the miscomprehension, and that 
eliminating these problems resulted in improved understanding, even for complex topics.
19
Several other studies have also compared comprehension of pattern instructions 
with comprehension of the same instructions rewritten for clarity by the experimenters. 
Elwork, et al. (1977) compared groups receiving either no instructions, Michigan pattern 
instructions, or rewritten instructions. Participants viewed a videotape of a Michigan 
traffic accident trial, after which they indicated their verdicts and completed a 
comprehension test covering materials in the jury instructions such as the role of the jury, 
courtroom procedures, driving laws, and negligence issues. The researchers found that 
comprehension scores were better for rewritten than pattern instructions, and that pattern 
instructions produced no better scores than the absence of instructions. Similarly, verdict 
errors (i.e., incorrect verdicts in view of the participants' conclusions about the facts o f the 
case) were fewest for the group receiving rewritten instructions, and about the same for 
the pattern and the “no instruction” groups. The researchers concluded that pattern 
instructions fail to help jurors understand the law, and in fact, appear to produce no better 
results than no instructions at all.
In later studies, these same authors (Elwork, et al., 1982) again compared original 
with rewritten instructions. In one study, jurors watched a videotape of an actual Nevada 
attempted murder trial. After the trial, one group of participants received the pattern 
instructions that had been presented at trial (re-recorded by one of the experimenters). 
Another group received instructions revised once by the researchers for improved clarity. 
After evaluating the results, the researchers revised the instructions yet again. A third 
group of participants viewed the trial and then received these twice-revised instructions.
Comprehension was measured with a short-answer questionnaire, using a face-to-
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face interview technique. Question examples include: “Who decides questions of fact?” 
[Proper answer: the jury ] “What is the name of the crime that the defendant is accused 
of?” [Attempted murder] “What is the purpose of jury instructions?” [To inform jurors 
of the laws that must be applied to the facts of the case.]
Participants receiving the original instructions scored an average of 51% correct 
Those receiving the once-revised instructions scored 60% correct. For those receiving the 
twice-revised version, the comprehension rate rose to 80%. Each increase was 
statistically significant.
The authors then ran a similar study using a shorter, videotaped burglary trial that 
involved simpler law and instructions. One group received instructions approximating 
pattern Florida criminal instructions. The other received instructions rewritten once by the 
researchers. The authors were interesting in seeing whether rewriting jury instructions 
would lead to improved comprehension scores when the factual and legal issues were 
relatively simple. Results were similar to the first study. Comprehension scores rose from 
65% for the original instructions to 80% for the revised instructions. The authors noted 
the apparent value of rewriting instructions for improved clarity, regardless of a trial’s 
complexity.
Severance and Loftus (1982) conducted an extensive series of studies on jury 
instructions. In the first study, the researchers analyzed questions posed by deliberating 
juries in actual criminal cases. By doing so, the researchers hoped to identify sources of 
juror misunderstanding. Through trial records, they identified written questions sent to 
judges during trial and the responses provided by the judges. About one-half of the
21
questions fell into one of four categories: (a) elements of the crime charged, particularly 
the meaning o f “intent;” (b) confusion over how to reach a verdict, especially the 
interpretation of “reasonable doubt” and the requirement of a unanimous verdict; (c) how 
to reach a decision when multiple charges were involved; and (d) requests related to 
physical evidence and oral testimony, such as asking to see a transcript of a witness’ 
testimony. Almost universally, the judges responded to the questions by merely referring 
to previously-given instructions without further comment or explanation. The authors 
expressed concern over the obvious confusion among jurors and the reluctance of judges 
to provide adequate guidance.
In Study 2, Severance and Loftus tested the ability o f jurors to answer questions 
about selected instructions and apply the instructions to a novel factual context. Three of 
the specific instructions selected for study — “reasonable doubt,” “intent,” and an 
instruction limiting the use of a defendant’s prior conviction — were chosen because they 
had been problematic for jurors in Study 1. In addition, the study included an instruction 
outlining jurors’ general duties.
Three instruction conditions existed: No Instructions (in which participants 
received no jury instructions at all); General Instruction (in which participants received 
only the instruction about a juror’s general duties); and General + Specific Instructions (in 
which participants received the general duty instruction plus the specific instructions about 
reasonable doubt, intent, and use of a prior conviction).
After the mock trial, participants were given a questionnaire that included a 
request for their verdict, a multiple-choice comprehension test covering the materials in
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the general and specific instructions, and an application test in which participants read a 
one-paragraph novel fact scenario and chose from a list the appropriate legal conclusion 
under the facts.
On the multiple-choice comprehension test, the specific instructions improved 
overall performance, i.e., the General + Specific group performed significantly better than 
the other groups. The general instruction helped jurors answer questions about their roles 
as jurors but did not produce better overall comprehension scores when compared with 
the absence of instructions. With respect to the specific legal topics tested, reasonable 
doubt was the only concept for which a specific instruction reduced errors; comprehension 
o f intent and use o f a prior conviction were not significantly affected by the availability of 
instructions.
On the application (novel facts) test, the general instruction actually impaired 
overall performance. Participants in the General Instruction group performed worse than 
participants in the No Instruction group. Moreover, participants in the General + Specific 
Instructions group performed only slightly better than those receiving no instructions at 
all, indicating that pattern instructions provided little help in applying legal concepts. The 
authors determined that the specific instructions provided no significant help in applying 
the concepts o f  intent and reasonable doubt. The instruction on use o f a prior conviction, 
however, did aid in the correct application of that concept.
In Study 3, Severance and Loftus rewrote several pattern instructions using the 
principles set forth in Charrow and Charrow (1979), discussed above. They summarized 
the process as follows;
. . .____ i ___ __ Sv&tems for microfilming and
f
We tried to eliminate legal jargon and uncommon words on the assumption that 
people have trouble perceiving, remembering and comprehending unfamiliar 
words. We also replaced abstract words with more concrete ones and avoided 
using homonyms (similar sounding words with more than one meaning). We made 
changes in grammar to avoid compound sentences and awkward, passive 
constructions. For example, the sentence, “Such evidence may be considered by 
you in deciding what weight or credibility should be given to the testimony of the 
defendant and for no other purpose,” was broken down into two parts: “You may 
not use this evidence in deciding whether he or she is guilty or innocent. You may 
use evidence of prior convictions only to decide whether to believe the defendant’s 
testimony and how much weight to give it.” [As another example], the phrase 
“you have an abiding belief in the truth of the charge...” was changed to “you 
believe in the truth of the charge...” (quoted from Severance, et al., 1984, p. 207- 
208, text and footnotes combined)
The participants were presented with a videotaped trial, followed by either pattern 
instructions (i.e., the general plus specific instructions from Study 2), revised instructions, 
or no instructions. Each participant then received the same questionnaire that had been 
used in Study 2.
The researchers found that participants receiving revised instructions were most 
likely to acquit. Those receiving no instructions were most likely to convict. Pattern 
instruction participants fell in the middle.
On the comprehension (multiple-choice) test, instructions appeared to aid overall
23
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comprehension, with the best performance turned in by those receiving revised 
instructions. A similar pattern was also found for test questions on each specific legal 
concept: Revised instructions produced the best comprehension, absence of instruction 
produced the worst comprehension, and pattern instructions produced results in the 
middle.
On the application (novel facts) test, revised instructions enhanced overall 
performance and produced the highest accuracy rates for each specific legal concept. This 
time, pattern instructions produced no better results than the absence of instructions.
A multiple regression of the data in Study 3 indicated that more legally 
knowledgeable participants (as indicated by comprehension and application scores) were 
“marginally more likely to acquit” (p. 192) in the particular case presented. The authors 
noted that the case was chosen because it involved ambiguous evidence that could 
reasonably lead to either conviction or acquittal. Thus, they concluded, under our legal 
system’s presumption of innocence, an increase in acquittals for this study probably 
indicates better understanding of the law. The authors predicted that “clearly understood 
instructions on the law will enhance a just determination of guilty or not guilty by 
sharpening the relevant decision criteria that jurors are supposed to apply to the facts” (p. 
195).
Severance, et al. (1984) did a follow-up to the previous series of studies by 
Severance and Loftus (1982), this time using actual jurors. Participants consisted of either 
former jurors or persons currently on jury duty waiting for a trial assignment. As before, 
the authors tested instructions on reasonable doubt, intent, limited use of a prior
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conviction, and general duties of the jury. A videotaped burglary trial was shown, 
followed by either pattern or revised instructions. (Unlike the previous study, this study 
did not utilize a “No Instructions” condition.) Again, a questionnaire was given that 
included a verdict decision, a multiple-choice comprehension test, and an application-to- 
novel-facts test. For this study, a paraphrase test was also incorporated.
The type of instruction (pattern or revised) did not have an effect on the verdict 
rendered by each participant. On other measures, the results were unspectacular but
Revised instructions also significantly improved comprehension for questions about the 
limited use of a prior conviction. In addition, participants receiving revised instructions 
were somewhat better able to apply the law to novel fact situations.
For the paraphrase test, participants were asked to paraphrase the genera! gist of 
the instructions, a procedure similar to that used by Charrow and Charrow (1979). 
Persons hearing revised instructions produced more correct idea units and fewer incorrect 
idea units than those hearing pattern instructions. In fact, the participants receiving 
revised instructions recited more correct than incorrect phrases, but the opposite was true 
for the participants receiving pattern instructions. This finding suggests that pattern 
instructions produce more confusion than understanding.
The authors compared the current jurors (waiting for assignment) with the former 
jurors. The current jurors tended to be younger, less educated, and less experienced with 
trials. Not surprisingly, these participants tended to benefit more than the former jurors
generally favored the linguistically-revised instructions. Slightly better overall
comprehension scores were achieved by participants receiving revised instructions.
26
from the simpler language of the revised instructions.
The authors also noted that the type of instruction had no effect on the likelihood 
of conviction. Thus, they concluded, the revisions did not introduce bias, but rather 
enhanced understanding of the appropriate legal principles.
As a final step, the researchers rewrote the instructions again, this time in what 
they called “supersimplified” form. (This form is most similar to what is now known as 
“plain language.”) In comparing pattern and supersimplified instructions using college 
students as participants, the authors found no significant differences on the multiple choice 
comprehension test. However, participants receiving supersimplified instructions were 
more accurate in applying the concept o f reasonable doubt to novel facts.
The studies discussed above generally support the use of simplified language in 
jury instructions covering general juror duties, introductory issues, and several commonly- 
encountered legal topics such as reasonable doubt, intent, and use of a prior conviction 
Other studies have also tested narrower, less-common concepts. The degree of 
improvement varied, but better comprehension or application scores generally resulted 
from simplifying instructions in several topic areas, including the defense of entrapment 
(Morier, Borgida, & Park, 1996), the death penalty (Diamond & Levi, 1996; Luginbuhl, 
1992; Weiner, et al., 1995), the use of eyewitness testimony (Greene, 1988), and the 
concept of intervening causation (Prager, Deckelbaum, & Cutler, 1989). For a recent 
discussion and summary of jury instruction research, including comprehension studies, see 
Lieberman and Sales (1997).
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Roadblocks to Improving Pattern Instructions
Judges often suspect that jurors do not understand jury instructions, but are 
reluctant to deviate from language established by pattern instructions. The issue of 
whether the jury understands instructions is speculative and as a practical matter, juror 
misunderstanding will not be detected and will not provide the basis for appeal. On the 
other hand, if the judge attempts to clarity instructions by supplementing or deviating from 
the language of pattern instructions, she or he runs the risk of misstating the law, resulting 
in appeal, reversal, and retrial. As noted above, Severance and Loftus (1982) found that 
judges rarely provide useful guidance in response to jurors’ questions about instructions. 
Thus, improving pattern instructions, rather than relying on judges to explain them at trial, 
appears to be the better route to juror understanding.
Rewriting pattern instructions, however, is expensive, tedious, and time- 
consuming. It has been described as a “beastly task” (Higgins, 1998, p. 43), requiring 
input from language specialists, lawyers, and judges; approval by competing inteicsts such 
as prosecutors and defense advocates; and ideally, testing on mock jurors These 
problems are inherent in the process and presumably cannot be avoided. But in addition 
to such logistical problems, the following arguments have also been levied against revising 
pattern instructions: arguments based essentially (and many would argue, incorrectly) on 
the assumption that change is unnecessary.
Attorneys' closing arguments. One argument rests on the belief that the trial 
attorneys will explain the law during opening and closing argument in a form 
understandable to the jury, obviating the need to alter current instructions (Reifman, et al..
The mierographic images on tl 
were filmed in the regular c 
(ANSI) for archival microfil 
document being filmed.
28
1992; Tanford, 1990). Although good attorneys usually do make legal points in simple 
terms, the attorneys should not be relied upon to provide the law; that is the job of the 
court. Severance, et al. (1984) called attorney arguments “inevitably biased,” requiring 
the court to provide neutral guidance so that jurors understand the relevant law.
Moreover, research findings indicate that juror confusion continues despite attorney 
argument. Several studies (e.g., O'Reilly, 1976; Reifman, et al., 1992) found that former 
jurors who had served in actual trials had very little understanding of basic legal concepts 
involved in the trials, notwithstanding that the jurors had heard opening and closing 
arguments from the attorneys. Similarly, studies using mock trial scenarios that included 
attorney argument (e.g., Ellsworth, 1989), also found low comprehension rates among 
participants. Thus, it is apparent that attorney argument should not be counted on to clear 
up confusion arising from jury instructions.
Deliberation. A second argument against clarifying jury instructions is based on 
the assumption that the deliberation process will cure misunderstandings. Proponents 
argue that the jurors who best understand the instructions will help the other jurors during 
the deliberation stage. Some researchers have found that juries as a whole perform better 
with the benefit of deliberation than without it (e.g.. Severance, et al., 1984; Forston, 
1975). Others, however, are less optimistic. Ellsworth (1989) found no difference 
between deliberating and non-deliberating mock trial jurors with respect to understanding 
the judge's instructions. On an 18-item true-false test covering the jury instructions, the 
deliberating jurors achieved an average score of only 11.7, not significantly different from 
random guessing. As part of the same study, Ellsworth analyzed statements jurors made
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during the deliberations. She observed that when discussing issues of law and attempting 
to reach a consensus, jurors were almost as likely to discard a correct idea and replace it 
with an incorrect one as vice versa (48% vs. 52% of the time). She concluded that
the results are quite distressing, since they mean that the jury does not recognize 
the right answer when it hears it. Juries who have heard the right definition are as 
likely to reject it as juries who have heard the wrong one. The jury as a whole 
does not profit from the abilities o f its best members when it comes to questions of 
law. (p. 219)
Similarly, in one study, Elwork, et al. (1982) found a comprehension rate o f only 
40% after mock trial deliberations (p. 66). In another study, the same authors found an 
error rate of 41 % after deliberation (p. 15). Diamond and Levi (1996) posit that 
deliberations only improve comprehension if a “substantial majority” (p. 230) of jury 
members correctly understand the material in the first place. Thus, the deliberation 
process appears to be ineffective in curing misunderstandings resulting from 
incomprehensible jury instructions.
Inherent complexity. Another argument raised in defending the current state of 
jury instructions concerns legal complexity (Steele & Thornburg, 1988; Tanford, 1990). 
Some attorneys argue that juror confusion arises from the inherent complexity of the law, 
rather than the language of the instructions, and no amount of redrafting will make the 
instructions comprehensible while still accurately reflecting the nuances of the law. The 
study by Charrow and Charrow (1979) casts doubt on this argument. Several California 
pattern jury instructions were presented to a group of attorneys who were asked to rate
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the conceptual complexity of the instructions without regard to linguistic problems. In 
other words, the attorneys were asked to disregard linguistic characteristics (such as 
vocabulary and grammatical form) and rate how difficult the legal concept(s) contained in 
each instruction would be for the average juror to understand. Later, participants were 
given one o f two versions of each instruction: either the pattern instruction or a rewritten 
version designed to convey the same information in linguistically-simplified form.
Charrow and Charrow found that rewriting produced the greatest increase in 
comprehension for the instructions that had been rated by attorneys as the most 
conceptually difficult. They concluded that even very complex concepts can be made 
more understandable with simplified language. In fact, the most conceptually difficult 
instructions seem to provide the best hope for improvement.
Recent Changes in Jury Instructions
Several states including Arizona, Pennsylvania, Florida, Montana, Oregon, 
Michigan, Wyoming, and Alaska, as well as the federal judicial system (Meyer & 
Rosenburg, 1971; Sales, et al., 1977; Saxton, 1998; Tanford, 1990), have attempted to 
address the problem of jury instruction comprehensibility by revising their pattern 
instructions according to psycholinguistic principles. The state of Michigan rewrote its 
criminal instructions in the early 1990's after a 1987 survey revealed that the state’s judges 
hated the old instructions. “They were embarrassed to give them to the jury because they 
were so wordy and so ridiculous,” explained Judge William Caprathe, chair of the rewrite 
committee. “They knew the jurors’ eyes just rolled back” (quoted at Higgins, 1998, p.
42). Following suit, the state of California recently began a four-year project to revise its
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criminal and civil instructions into plain English (McCarthy, 2000).
A 1995 report of the Minnesota Bar Association called for the revision of 
Minnesota jury instructions into plain English (Park, 1999). Four years later, the 
Minnesota Committee on Jury Instruction Guides set out to revise the state's pattern 
instructions for civil trials. The committee employed the aid of Rosemarie J. Park, a 
professor of education at the University o f Minnesota specializing in adult literacy. Park 
served as a “plain language consultant” in the drafting of an entirely new set o f civil jury 
instructions (Park, 1999.)
Park (1999) outlined some of the plain language principles and recommendations 
that were incorporated into the new pattern instructions (referred to in Minnesota as “Jury 
Instruction Guides” or “JIGs”). For example, written copies of the instructions are usually 
provided to the jury, and it is now recommended that these copies include subheadings. 
Subheadings enable jurors to scan a set of instructions and find information quickly, and 
also require the person preparing the instructions to organize material so that only one 
concept is included in each paragraph.
The new instructions utilize party names, such as “Mrs. Smith,” rather than 
“plaintiff” and “defendant,” because jurors often confuse the generic legal terms. (The 
older instructions used party names sporadically.) The instructions also now use first 
person designations. “I” has replaced “the court” (“I have decided that Mrs. Smith was 
not at fault”), and “you” has replaced “the jury” (“It is your job to find the facts”).
Whenever feasible, passive language was revised into its active form. For 
example, “the law requires that fault be apportioned among those parties found to be at
Date
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fault” was rewritten as “You must decide the degree to which each person was at fault.” 
Difficult legal terms were avoided where possible (for example, ‘ property” was 
substituted for “chattel”) or defined if their use was necessary (for example, “superseding 
cause” is defined at instruction number 27.20). Many redundant legal terms (like “usual 
and customary”) were also eliminated.
Paragraphs were shortened so that each contained only one main idea. To 
illustrate, consider the basic pretrial instruction. The old version consisted of 15 
paragraphs and three subheadings. The portions of the new version that cover the same 
material consist of 38 paragraphs and five subheadings. In the new instructions, each new 
idea was placed on a new line, sometimes resulting in the abandonment of traditionally- 
recognized paragraph structure.
Sentences were broken down and shortened to enhance comprehension. Park 
discussed the following example. One o f the old JIGs provided as follows:
A passenger has a duty to take active measures to protect (himselt)(herself) from 
danger only whe.: it is apparent that (he)(she) can no longer rely upon the driver 
for protections, [as when the driver by his conduct shows that (he)(she) is 
incompetent to drive or where the driver is unmindful of or does not know of a 
danger known to the passenger] and then only if the passenger becomes aware of 
the danger at a time and under circumstances where (he)(she) could have 
prevented the harm. (p. XLII)
The new version says:
“A passenger must act to protect himself or herself when:
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a. It is apparent that the driver cannot do so, and 
b The passenger’s action could have prevented the harm” (p. XLII).
Where feasible, the new instructions use lists, including vertical lists, to organize 
and simplify material (as illustrated by the example immediately above).
Traditional grammatical rules are occasionally violated. For example, if clarity is 
improved, sentences might begin with “And,” “But,” or “So,” infinitives might be split, 
and sentences might end with a preposition. Park explained, “plain language emphasizes 
meaning over rules and clarity over elegance” (p. XLIII).
Testing Today’s Plain Language Jury Instructions
Despite action by several states toward plain language jury instructions, most 
states still have made no attempt to simplify and improve their pattern instructions 
(Ellsworth & Reifman, 2000). The plain language movement has progressed slowly with 
respect to jury instructions, and jury instruction revision continues to be the subject of 
discussion and debate in many states (Higgins, 1998).
The current study was designed to investigate whether linguistic change is feasible 
and helpful today, due to two factors that distinguish it from most prior studies. These 
distinctions concern the legal sufficiency of the revised instructions and the degree of 
difference between the original and revised instructions.
In prior studies, the experimenters rewrote the instructions, usually without any 
formal procedure for testing their legal sufficiency. Thus, the accuracy of the rewritten 
instructions was not established. The current study tested actual simplified Minnesota juiy 
instructions: instructions not only drafted under plain language principles, but developed
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by a drafting committee of attorneys and judges for use in actual court trials. These 
instructions are currently in use in Minnesota. Research utilizing such instructions may 
provide more relevant or convincing evidence of the need for revision (or lack thereof) 
than studies in which instructions were revised by the experimenters.
Furthermore, the jury instructions used in prior studies may not be representative 
of instructions currently existing in many states. Most of the prior studies were conducted 
in the 1970’s or early 1980's, and involved pattern instructions that contained archaic, 
difficult linguistic passages. Drafting committees may consider their current pattern 
instructions to be simpler, and may be unpersuaded by research based on older, more 
convoluted instructions. (In fact, the “revised” instructions in some prior studies — the 
ones generally found to increase comprehension — are similar to the older, non plain 
language instructions recently superseded in Minnesota.) Thus, for some states, the 
question remains open whether further revision into plain language would be helpful. 
Minnesota’s recent foray into plain language jury instructions provided an opportunity to 
test that question.
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C H A P T E R  II
METHOD
Participants
Eighty-three undergraduates at the University of North Dakota (44 women, 39 
men) served as participants in this study. Subjects were recruited through a sign-up sheet 
at the psychology building, and received course credit for their participation. Subjects 
were required to be at lea st 18 years old (the minimum age for jury duty) and no subject 
was allowed to participate more than once. Most subjects were underclassmen (48 
freshmen, 17 sophomores, 14 juniors, and 4 seniors).
Materials
1. Jury instructions. The jury instructions used in this study consisted of 
instructions selected from the new (drafted in 1999) Minnesota Jury Instruction Guides 
("JIGs"), and corresponding instructions from the last-previous version of the Minnesota 
JIGs (see Minnesota District Judges Association Committee on Jury Instruction Guides, 
1986, 1999).
The following specific instructions were selected:
Title/topic Old JIG # New JIG #
Prelim. Instruction (Before Trial) 1 10.15
Duties of Judge and Jury 2 10.20
Consider Instructions as a Whole 3 (part of 10.20)
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Deliberation and Verdict (divided) 10.45
- Foreperson 200 10.45
- Duty to Discuss 206 10.45
- Kinds of Verdicts 203 10.45
- Responsibility 201 & 205 10.45
Direct and Circumstantial Evid. 20 12.10
Impeachment 24 12.25
Burden of Proof 70 14.15
Negligence 101 25.10
Direct Cause 140 27.10
Superseding Cause 142 27.20
These particular instructions were chosen primarily because they are common to virtually 
every civil trial, and because the topics addressed in these instructions have been tested in 
prior studies (e.g., Elwork, et al., 1977).
For some instructions, the new version contained material that had no counterpart 
in the older instructions. For example, new JIG 10.45 includes subsections covering items 
that are allowed into the deliberation room, how the jury is to communicate its verdict, 
and the jury’s duty to keep the deliberations secret. By contrast, the old instructions 
contained no corresponding information. In order to keep the content of the instructions 
as consistent as possible across treatment groups, subsections that have no counterpart 
were omitted in this study.
The researcher prepared audiotaped recordings of both sets o f instructions for 
presentation to the participants. In addition, a written copy of the instructions was 
available for each participant. Topical headings that are contained in the instructions were 
omitted from the audio recording but included on the written copies, consistent with 
general practice and the recommendations of the drafting, committee (Park, 1999). Each 
set o f instructions was presented in numerical order according to the JIG numbers listed
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above, to reflect the order of presentation in actual trials.
The text of each instruction as it was used in this study appears in the appendices 
(Appendix A contains the old instructions. Appendix B the new, plain language 
instructions.)
2. Comprehension test. A comprehension test was administered to each 
participant. The test consisted of 28 multiple-choice, true-false, fill-in-the-blank, and short 
essay questions relating to material covered in the jury instructions. The test appears at 
Appendix C. True-false and multiple choice items were scored as either zero points 
(incorrect) or two points (correct). Fill-in-the-blank and short essay questions were 
scored as zero, one, or two points, depending on how well the subject appeared to grasp 
the material. The maximum possible score on the test was 56 points.
A paper and pencil test was chosen for its ease of administration and scoring, and 
because events in a mock trial scenario are difficult to interpret. English and Sales (1997) 
recommend that initial testing of jury instructions be outside a mock trial context, in order 
to simplify the participants’ task.
3. Verbal test. The vocabulary section of the Nelson-Denny Reading Test (Form 
E) (Brown, Bennett, & Hanna, 1981) was administered to test for general verbal ability. 
The Nelson-Denny is a 15-minute, 100-item, multiple-choice vocabulary test.
4. Demographic questionnaire. Participants completed a short questionnaire of 
demographic information, including age, gender, year in school, prior occupation, college 
major, native language, legal training, and prior juiy experience. A copy of the 
questionnaire appears at Appendix D.
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Participants signed up for group sessions of up to ten persons. Actual session 
sizes ranged from seven to eleven subjects. One of two treatments was administered 
during each session. Under one treatment, participants received selected pre-1999 
instructions. Under the other treatment, participants received new instructions covering 
the same material.
At the start of the session, each participant read and signed a consent form. The 
researcher then reminded the participants of the purpose of the study and of the upcoming 
procedures. Each participant then received a written copy of the jury instructions to be 
used in that session. The participants were encouraged to follow along on the written 
copy as the researcher then played the audiotaped recording of the instructions. 
(Participants were allowed to look at a written copy of the instructions because real jurors 
usually do so, and because certain visual changes were incorporated into the new 
instructions for clarity.) The experimenter then retrieved all written copies of the 
instructions and administered the comprehension test. Subjects were asked to proceed 
forward through the comprehension test and not return to a previous question and change 
an answer. (This was done because some of the later questions may have revealed the 
answers to earlier questions.) After all participants in the session completed the 
comprehension test, the researcher collected the tests. Participants were then 
administered the Nelson-Denny vocabulary test (Form E) under standard conditions for 
that test, including a 15-minute time limit. Finally, participants completed the 
demographic questionnaire.
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C H A P T E R  III
RESULTS
Demographic Characteristics
The groups did not differ significantly with respect to the age of the participants. 
As shown on Table 1, the mean age of those receiving the older, non plain language jury 
instructions (“old group,” N=40) was 20.23 years (SD=3.88). The mean age of those 
receiving the newer, plain language jury instructions (“new group,” N=43) was 20.63 
years (SD=3.02).
Table 1
Demographic Characteristics of Each Treatment Group
Group Composition (in percentages)
Group
Mean Age 
in years Women Men Freshmen Sophomores Juniors Seniors
Old 20.23
(3.88)
42.5 57.5 70.0 15.0 12.5 2.5
New 20.63
(3.02)
62.8 37.2 46.5 25.6 20 9 7.0
Note. Parentheses indicate standard deviations.
The groups did differ, however, on other demographic characteristics. Although 
the overall gender mix was approximately equal (53% women, 47% men), women 
constituted 62.8% of the new group and only 42.5% of the old group. Thus, women were
39
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overrepresented in the new group and underrepresented in the old group. In addition, the 
old group contained a disproportionately high number of freshmen, while the new group 
contained most of the sophomores, juniors, and seniors. These demographic 
characteristics did not, however, appear to produce group differences on the dependent 
variable, as indicated by the regression analysis discussed later.
Comprehension Test Total Score
The dependent variable of primary interest was total score on the comprehension 
test (56 possible points). Scores ranged from a low of 19 to a high of 54. The overall 
mean for all subjects was 36.41 fSD-7.41-). The two treatment groups produced virtually 
identical mean scores. The old group had an average score of 36.'/0 (SD=7.28). The new 
group had an average score of 36.14 (SD=7.60V The difference was not significant, 
t(81)=.34, £=.733. These results are shown on Table 2.
Vocabulary Test
On the 100-point Nelson-Denny vocabulary test, the raw scores ranged from 33 to 
93 (M=60.31, SD=i5.74V Percentile scores (relative to nationwide norms for each 
college year) ranged from 7 to 96 (M=52.80, SD=25.70). The old group scored better on 
the vocabulary test (raw score M=63.45, SD= 16.27: percentile score M=59.70,
SD=25.75) than did the new group (raw score M=57.40, SD=14.83; percentile score 
M=46.37, SD=24.21). Using an alpha level of .05, the difference in raw scores was 
marginally significant, t(8 1 )=1.77, £=.080. The difference in percentile scores was 
significant, t(81)=2.43, £=.017. These results are shown on Table 2.
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Vocabulary scores were significantly correlated with comprehension scores, 
r=.563, g< 001. The relationship between vocabulary and comprehension scores was 
similar for both groups (old group r-,596, jj<001; new group r=.540, jK.OOl).
Based on prior research (Severance, et al., 1984), the simplification of jury 
instructions was expected to benefit people of lower verbal skills more than people of 
higher verbal skills. Thus, the participants were divided into two groups according to 
their scores on the vocabulary test. “Low verbal” subjects were defined as those who 
scored below the median raw score (57) on the vocabulary test. “High verbal” subjects 
scored above the median. (For purposes of this median-split analysis, three subjects were 
omitted because they produced the exact median score.)
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Not surprisingly, the high verbal participants scored significantly better on the 
comprehension test (M=39.41, SD=7.00) than the low verbal participants (M=33.44, 
SD=6.84), F(l,76)=14.77, g<001. But the key issue was how the two verbal groups 
responded to differences injury instructions. High verbal subjects who received the new 
jury instructions averaged about two points better on the comprehension test (M=40.4I, 
SD=6.30) than those receiving the old instructions (M=38.71, SD=7.50), a non-significant 
difference, t(39)=.76, £=.449. Contrary to expectation, however, for low verbal 
participants — the ones assumed to benefit most from new instructions — comprehension 
scores for both instruction groups were virtually identical (old group M=33.40, SD=6.02; 
new group M=33.46, SD=7.42; t(37)=.03, £=.980). These results are shown on Table 3. 
Table 3
Mean Scores on the Comprehension Test for High- and Low-Verbal Participants bv 
Treatment Group, and T-Test Results for Treatment Group Comparisons
V erbal/T reatment 
Condition Mean SD t sig.
High Verbal Participants
Old group 38.71 7.50
.76 .449
New group 40.41 6.30
Overall 39.41 7.00
Low Verbal Participants
Old group 33.40 6.02
.03 .980
New group 33.46 7.42
Overall 33.44 6 84
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Because vocabulary scores were significantly correlated with comprehension 
scores, covariate analyses were conducted to factor out the apparent pre-existing group 
differences in verbal skills. When vocabulary raw score was used as the covariate, the 
new group produced a slightly higher adjusted score (M=36.93, SE=0.950) than the old 
group (M=35.85, SE=0.980). This difference was not significant, F(l,80)=. 61, p=436. A 
second covariate analysis was conducted using vocabulary percentile score as the 
covariate. This produced a slightly greater, but still non-significant, difference between 
the groups (new group M=37.11, SE=1.00, old group M=35.66, SE=1.04; F( 1,80)=.97, 
j>=.327). Covariate analyses results appear on Table 4.
Table 4
Group Mean SE F sig.









A regression analysis was conducted using total score on the comprehension test 
as the dependent variable. Jury instruction treatment group, vocabulary raw score, 
gender, and college year were tested as predictors. A forward regression analysis was
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employed. This regression method adds predictor variables into the model sequentially 
according to their significance levels. The process stops when there are no more variables 
that explain a significant portion o f additional variance. Here, the significance level 
required for entry into the model was set at 0.05. Undei this procedure, vocabulary raw 
score pro 'ed to be the only significant predictor o f comprehension score, F(l,81)=37.53, 
E<001 (#=  563, g<001), accounting for 31.7% of the variance in comprehension score. 
Jury instruction group, gender, and college year did not qualify for inclusion in the model. 
Individual Comprehension Test Items
The comprehension test consisted of 28 individual questions. Each of these items 
was analyzed to determine whether the two jury instruction treatment groups differed in 
comprehension. Score information for each of the 28 items is presented on Table 5.
The question on which subjects performed best was question number 20. All but 
one subject (98.8%) knew that the following is a false statement: “During the course of 
the trial, it is the civic duty of jurors to gather information about the case from news 
reports.” The items answered correctly by the fewest participants were questions 5 and 13 
(24% and 17% correct, respectively). Both of these questions were expected to be very 
difficult, requiring participants to understand limitations on the use o f a witness’ prior 
inconsistent statement, and how those limitations differ for party and non-party witnesses
Four questions produced significant differences (p<.05) between the jury 
instruction groups. The new group scored better on questions 9 (all jury instructions are 
equally important) and 14 (application o f the “reasonable person” standard for 
negligence). The old group scored better on questions 23 (the jury should not consider
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Mean Score, Standard Deviation, and Proportion Correct for Each Question on the Comprehension Test, bv Jury Instruction Group
Treatment Group Question number
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q ll Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15
New group (N=43)
M 1.84 1.72 1.16 1.58 0.33 1.72 1.12 1.26 2.00 0.70 1.67 1.63 0.33 1.49 1.67
SD .53 .70 1.00 .82 .75 .70 1.00 .98 .00 .96 .75 .79 .75 .88 .75
Prop, correct .92 .86 .58 .79 .17 .86 .56 .63 1.00 .35 .84 .82 .17 .75 .84
Old group (N=40)
M 1.93 1.85 1.50 1.75 0.65 1.80 1.20 1.20 1.75 0.80 1.50 1.35 0.35 0.95 1.50
SD .35 .53 .88 .67 .95 .61 .99 .99 .67 .99 .88 .95 .77 1.01 .88
Prop, correct .97 .93 .75 .88 .33 .90 .60 .60 .88 .40 .75 .68 .18 .48 .75
Treatment Group
Q16 Q17 Q18 Q19 Q20 Q21
Ouestion number 
Q22 Q23 Q24 Q25 Q26 Q27 Q28 Total
New group (N=43)
M 1.49 1.77 1.26 1.91 2.00 1.30 0.60 1.21 1.07 0.51 0.84 1.02 0.95 36.14
SD .88 .65 .98 .43 .00 .96 .93 .99 1.01 .88 .75 .64 .82 7.60
Prop, correct .75 .89 .63 .96 1.00 .65 .30 .61 .54 .26 .42 .51 .48 .65
Old group (N=40)
M 1.75 1.80 1.10 1.90 1.95 1.45 0.70 1.75 0.85 0.55 1.30 0.85 0.68 36.70
SD .67 .61 1.01 .44 .32 .90 .97 .67 1.00 .90 .82 .80 .94 7.28
Prop, correct .88 .90 .55 .95 .98 .73 .35 .88 .43 .28 .65 .43 .34 .66
Note. For questions 1, 26,27, and 28, answers were scored as 0, 1, or 2 points. For these items and for Total score, proportion correct refers to the proportion 
of total possible points. For all other questions, scores were either 0 (incorrect) or 2 (correct). For these items, proportion correct refers to both the proportion 
of total possible points and the proportion of group subjects who got the item correct.
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the effect of its answers on the parties) and 26 (circumstances for a non-unanimous 
verdict). Table 6 gives score and t-test information for these four questions.
Table 6
Mean Scores and T-Test Results for Comprehension Test Questions Producing 
Significant Group Differences
Test Item Old Group New Group t sig.
Ques. 9 1.75 (0.67) 2.00 (0.00) 2.36* .023*
Ques. 14 0.95(1.01) 1.49 (0.88) 2.58* .012*
Ques. 23 1.75 (0.67) 1.21 (0.99) 2.93* .004*
Ques. 26 1.30 (0.82) 0.84 (0.75) 2.67* .009*
Note. Parentheses indicate standard deviations. 
*p < .05.
For some o f the questions, participants were expected to make certain errors based 
on common misconceptions about legal rules. For example, it was anticipated that some 
participants would mistakenly think that fewer juror votes are required for a defense 
verdict than for a plaintiff verdict (see Forston, 1975, finding that many people believe a 
non-unanimous verdict is acceptable for a not-guiity verdict). In fact, a verdict for either 
side requires unanimity (except under limited circumstances in a civil case). Any other 
result constitutes a hung jury, not a verdict. Accordingly, the comprehension test included 
separate questions asking how many juror votes are required for a plaintiff verdict and for 
a defense verdict (see questions 1 and 2, Appendix C). The best answer for both 
questions was six. An answer of five was also credited because under certain
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circumstances, five jurors may return a verdict. Most participants (89%) gave credited 
answers. Twelve subjects (14%), however, incorrectly indicated that the number of jurors 
differs. (The percentages add to more than 100 due to overlap between these categories.) 
Consistent with the researcher’s expectation, seven subjects stated that more jurors are 
required for a verdict against the defendant. Surprisingly, five people apparently believed 
that a verdict against the defendant is easier to achieve, requiring fewer jurors, than a 
verdict in defendant’s favor.
It was also anticipated that people would incorrectly assume that circumstantial 
evidence is legally inferior to direct evidence (see, e g., Strawn & Buchanan, 1976, finding 
that only 57% of instructed subjects understood that circumstantial evidence constitutes 
legal evidence). Indeed, 41% of the participants in the current study incorrectly endorsed 
the following statement: “By law, direct evidence is more reliable and more important 
than circumstantial evidence” (see question 18, Appendix C).
Based on pilot work, the researcher also predicted that participants would 
inappropriately invoke a criminal standard of proof (see question 10, Appendix C). As 
expected, over half (58%) o f the subjects responded that in order for the jury to vote yes 
to a claim, the claim must be “proved beyond a reasonable doubt” (the criminal standard). 
Moreover, six percent thought acceptance o f a claim requires that “no believable evidence 
was presented against the claim” (not a standard of proof in any type of case). These 
descriptions of proof are far more strict than the correct civil standard contained in the 
instructions: In order to vote for a claim, the jury must believe that “the claim is more 
likely true than not true.” Only 37% of the participants responded correctly.
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In a similar vein, subjects were asked to quantify the level o f persuasion on a scale 
of 0 to 100, with the specification that “50” represents an equal split of evidence for and 
against the claim (see question 25, Appendix C). No law or jury instruction actually 
specifies proof on a quantified scale, but a correct understanding of the instructions should 
produce an answer of about 51. (Credited answers included “51%”, “X>50", and 
“51/49”.) Sixty-nine percent (56 out o f the 81 subjects who responded with a number) 
quantified the level of persuasion as being “75” or higher. Almost half (45%) of the 
participants indicated that persuasion must be “100%,” an incorrect standard even in 
criminal cases requiring the highest level o f proof in American law.
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C H A P T E R  IV
DISCUSSION
General Findings and Limitations of the Study
The results of this study failed to support the hypothesis that plain language 
instructions would produce higher overall scores on the comprehension test. A number of 
factors, however, may explain the lack of difference in scores. First, as a group, 
participants receiving the plain language instructions appeared to have lesser verbal skills 
(as measured by the vocabulary test) than participants receiving the older instructions. 
Vocabulary skills were correlated with comprehension scores, confounding the results. A 
covariate analysis suggested that had the groups been equal on vocabulary score, the new 
group would have scored slightly better than the old group, as predicted. The difference 
in adjusted means, however, was unimpressive (less than two points out of a possible 56) 
and non-significant. Moreover, regression analysis indicated that vocabulary score, but 
not jury instruction group, predicted comprehension score. Also, only the high verbal 
participants appeared to benefit (and only minimally) from the language change. Thus, 
two conclusions are suggested by the results of this study. First, a person’s verbal skills 
exert a significantly greater influence on comprehension than the language style of the jury 
instructions. And second, the new instructions failed to accomplish their primary purpose: 
increasing comprehension among people who need it most — those with lesser verbal
49
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skills. More research is needed, however, in which the results are not confounded by an 
unequal distribution o f verbal skills across treatment groups.
Because jury instruction group did not appear to create any comprehension 
difference, a question arises regarding how much the instructions helped at all. In fact, the 
responses to the essay questions (i.e., items 26 (non-unanimous verdict), 27 (direct 
evidence), and 28 (circumstantial evidence)), were often surprisingly devoid of any 
apparent grasp of the material. This was true even for the group receiving the new 
instructions, in which specific examples were added to help define and clarify the concepts 
of direct and circumstantial evidence. An interesting follow-up study could involve 
administering the comprehension test to participants who have not received any jury 
instructions at all. This might identify what proportion o f correct answers are the product 
o f pre-existing knowledge or guessing. (Notwithstanding the poor performance by some 
on the essay questions, the new group scored better (49% of the possible points) than the 
old group (38%) in defining direct and circumstantial evidence. Although the difference 
was not significant, it may suggest that the new added language is beneficial for some 
people.)
The dependent variable measure may have posed a problem in this study. The 
comprehension test was designed to assess understanding of the instructions but may have 
been ambiguous or confusing for the subjects. If so, the test may have failed to tap into 
whatever comprehension differences existed. For example, question number three asked, 
“In a jury trial, who decides fact issues? In other words, who decides what events actually 
occurred?” It was assumed that this question would be very easy and that virtually every
51
participant would write, “the jury.” Instead, answers included not only the jury, but the 
judge, the lawyers, the witnesses, the evidence, and others. Obviously, participants 
interpreted this question in many different ways. Perhaps future research could include an 
interview component to identify ambiguities.
Scoring proved to be more difficult than expected. Scoring criteria were prepared 
in advance, but many subjects provided unanticipated answers to the open-ended 
questions or multiple responses to single-answer questions. Also, a few questions were so 
broad that few preset criteria could be established (e g., questions 27 and 28). Thus, 
scoring was often a “seat of the pants” decision. Moreover, the researcher did all scoring 
by herself. The eventual scores, then, were to some extent the product o f subjective 
scoring by a single person. Any bias or inconsistency in the researcher’s scoring, though 
unintended and unidentified, could have affected the results. 1 Edition, the decision to 
score on the basis of two points per question (in order to allow one-point partial credit for 
open-ended questions) weighted the responses differently than if only one point per 
question and no partial credit had been allowed.
The generalizability of this study may be limited due to the use o f college students 
as participants. Prior studies (Forston, 1975; Severance, et a!., 1984; see Lieberman & 
Sales, 1997) have suggested that well-educated subjects are better able to understand 
older, more convoluted instructions and therefore derive less benefit from simplified 
language. Accordingly, the use of college students in this study may have minimized 
differences in comprehension that would otherwise have resulted from the language 
revision. Perhaps a greater difference would be identified by including a more diverse
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population of jury-aged community members in fature research.
It is possible, of course, that the jury instructions used in this study simply do not 
produce any comprehension difference. Most of the prior research in this field, conducted 
during the 1970's and 1980's, found low comprehension rates for then-current instructions 
and improved comprehension for revised instructions. But in the current study, the “old” 
treatment consisted of relatively modern instructions (compared with the prior research), 
and the “new” treatment consisted o f a language style virtually untested before now. The 
only previous jury instruction study that addressed a similar linguistic difference found 
only very limited improvement for what the authors called “supersimplified” language 
(Severance, et al., 1984), language similar to today’s “plain language.” It may be that 
simplification to the level now found in Minnesota civil jury instructions produces no 
advantage over the language style that had been in effect prior to that.
Group Differences on Individual Test Items
The two treatment groups produced significantly different error rates on 4 of the 
28 comprehension test items. The new group scored better on questions 9 and 14, and the 
old group scored better on questions 23 and 26.
Question nine asked the participants which jury instructions are most important. 
The correct multiple-choice answer was d (“All instructions are equally important”). All 
participants in the new group gave the correct answer, but five participants in the old 
group (12.5%) responded incorrectly, producing a significant group difference. The jury 
instructions pertaining to this issue appear to be very much alike. The older instruction 
reads: “In following my instructions, you must follow all o f them and not single out some
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and ignore others; they are all equally important” (p. 60, App. A). The new instruction 
reads; “You must follow all o f the instructions. Do not single out some and ignore 
others-all o f them are equally important” (p. 67, App. B). There is no apparent 
explanation within the jury instructions for the group difference on question number nine. 
Rather, the difference seems to be a statistical artifact. The new group scores produced a 
standard deviation of zero, thus inflating the t-value and creating a statistical difference.
In fact, the actual difference in mean scores (0.25) was smaller than the mean difference 
for several other questions that had higher standard deviations and thus, non-significant 
t-values.
Question 14 was a negligence application question requiring participants to 
recognize that negligence is tested on an objective standard. Question 14 stated as 
follows;
You are a juror in a negligence trial. You believe both of the following facts:
In this question, fact 1 contains the essential definition of negligence. Fact 2 is irrelevant. 
The correct response is option a (“Yes”). Three-fourths (74.5%) of participants receiving 
the new instructions answered correctly, but less than half (47.5%) of those receiving the 
old instructions were correct. The old instruction (p. 63, App. A) provides as follows:
1. A reasonable person would have acted differently than the 
defendant did.
2. The defendant believed he was being reasonable and careful.
Will you vote to find the defendant negligent?
a. Yes
b. No
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Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care. Reasonable care is that 
care which a reasonable person would use under like circumstances. Negligence is 
the doing of something which a reasonable person would not do, or the failure to 
do something which a reasonable person would do, under like circumstances.
The new instruction (p. 69, App. B) provides as follows:
Definition of “reasonable care”
Reasonable care is the care a reasonable person would use in the same or similar 
circumstances.
Definition of “negligence”
Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care.
Ask yourself what a reasonable person would have done in these circumstances. 
Negligence occurs when a person:
Thus, the new instruction contains obvious changes in wording, grammar, organization, 
line spacing, headings, and use of lists. These changes may be responsible for better 
comprehension by the new group on question 14.
Question 23 was a true/false item asking subjects to endorse or disclaim the 
following statement: “When answering questions on the verdict form, jurors should 
consider the effect that their answers will have on each party.” [Correct answer: false ] 
Eighty-eight percent o f the old group participants responded correctly, compared with 
only 61% of the new group participants. Other than passive and active language, the 
instructions on this issue are quite similar. The old instruction provides: “Whether or not 
a particular answer is favorable to one party or the other should not concern you” (p. 62, 
App. A). The new instruction provides: “You must not be concerned that a particular
ojL.
Does something a reasonable person would not do; or 
Fails to do something a reasonable person would do.
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answer on the verdict form is favorable to one party or the other” (p. 67, App. B). There 
seems to be no obvious explanation for better scores with the older instruction.
The final item to produce significant group differences was question 26. This was 
an open-ended, short-essay question asking, “Under what circumstances may a verdict be 
non-unanimous (that is, not all jurors agree)?” Responses were scored as 0, 1, or 2 
points. A two-point answer included the two most important requirements: a minimum of 
six hours o f deliberation, and five jurors concurring in the verdict. (The jury instructions 
used in this study were designed for a six-person jury.) The old group scored 65% of the 
possible points, the new group only 42%. In this case, the difference may have been 
produced by the heading of one of the instructions, rather than the text. The new 
instructions included the relevant information as part o f a long section, and within a 
subsection labeled “Divided verdict” (p. 68, App. B). The old instructions included the 
information in a short section with this major heading centered on the page:
RETURN OF VERDICT—
5/6 VERDICT
(p. 64, App. A). Fully 20% of the old group participants included the fraction "5/6" in 
their responses to questions 1, 2, and/or 26, even though whole numbers would have been 
more appropriate answers. (Other subjects may also have remembered the fraction but 
opted to respond in non-fraction form.) The relatively high occurrence of this response 
suggests that the "5/6" designation in the old instruction was quite memorable. This may 
explain why the old group scored better than the new group on question 26.
The micrographic images on this film are accurate reproductions of records delivered to Modern l"f «on System for microfiJming end 
were filmed in the regular course of business. The photographic process meets standards of the American National Standards Institute 





Perhaps the most interesting finding in this study is that people appear to maintain 
preconceived notions about legal rules despite instruction to the contrary. Ellsworth 
(1989) noted that “juries rely at least as much on legal knowledge gained outside the 
courtroom as they are [sic] on the judge’s instructions” (p. 221). In the current study, the 
participants were advised at the start o f the session that they would be listening to 
instructions relating to a civil case. The jury instructions themselves specifically stated 
that a “more likely true than not true” standard of proof was to be applied. Nevertheless, 
on the comprehension test, over half (58%) of the participants indicated that proof must 
be “beyond a reasonable doubt,” 69% quantified the level o f persuasion as being 75% or 
higher, and almost half (45%) quantified it at 100%, an improper standard in any ttial. It 
would seem that the high standard of proof in criminal trials, so often recited on television 
and in movies, not only resists being replaced by new information, but becomes elevated 
even beyond its legitimate parameters (see also Saxton (1998), finding that 38% of 
instructed participants applied a criminal standard in a civil case).
Similarly, almost half o f the participants incorrectly indicated that circumstantial 
evidence is legally inferior to direct evidence. This seems to be a common misconception 
among laypersons. Strawn and Buchanan (1976) found that despite instruction to the 
contrary, barely half o f their subjects understood that circumstantial evidence is legal 
evidence. Saxton (1998) found that after being instructed to give equal weight to direct 
and circumstantial evidence, over one-third of his subjects believed they were required by 
law to give less weight to circumstantial evidence. The law, in fact, makes no distinction
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between the value of direct and circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence can 
support an entire case.
Additional insight into people’s pre-existing beliefs comes from questions about 
the number o f jurors required for a verdict. Although an impressive number of 
participants responded correctly, 12 participants ( i 4%) incorrectly indicated that a 
different number of jurors is required for a defense verdict as compared with a plaintiff 
verdict. Most o f these subjects thought that fewer juror votes were required for a defense 
verdict (see Forston, 1975, finding that former jurors believed non-unanimity was 
acceptable for a not guilty verdict). This finding is probably the product o f two factors: 
misconception about criminal rules (unanimity is required for any criminal verdict), and the 
failure of most people to realize the distinction between criminal and civil rules (see, eg., 
O’Reilly, 1976, noting that “defendants in civil cases were being found ‘guilty’ or ‘not 
guilty’” (p. 70), verdicts that exist only in criminal cases).
Thus, it would appear that at least on some issues, participants retained prior 
notions about the law and failed to recognize or retain contrary information from the 
instructions. Similarly, Smith (1993) found that naive beliefs about the elements of crimes 
lead to inaccurate verdicts among mock jurors. She further found that more accurate 
verdicts resulted when common misconceptions were specifically acknowledged injury 
instructions, followed immediately by a statement of the correct rule. Saxton (1998) also 
found jury instructions ineffective in dislodging preconceived beliefs about circumstantial 
evidence and burdens of proof. He recommended that jury instructions acknowledge such 
likely errors and explain why they are incorrect.
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With regard to the standard o f proof issue, for example, instead of simply stating 
the civil standard, jurors might be told something like this:
Many people think that all court cases must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, 
but this is not true. That level o f proof is only required in criminal cases. Today, 
however, you are deciding a civil case. In today’s case, you should vote “yes” to a 
claim if you believe that the claim is more likely true than not true.
By cognitively activating and negating the preconceived notion, jurors may be more likely 
to recognize the contradiction between prior knowledge and current instruction, and 
better able to revise their beliefs accordingly.
The micrographic images on this film ore accurate reproductions 
were filmed in the regular course of business. The photograph! 
(ANSI) for archival microfilm. NOTICE: If the filmed image a 
document being filmed.
ccurate reproductions of records delivered to Modern Information Systems for microfilming and 
ness. The photographic process meets standards of the American National standards Institute 
If the filmed image above is less legible than this Notice, i t  is duo to the quality of the
APPENDICES
<am
The micrographic images on this film are accurate reproductions of records delivered to Modern Information Systems for microfilming and 
were filmed in the regular course of business. The photographic process meets standards of the American National Standards Institute 





APPENDIX A: OLD (PRE-1999) JURY INSTRUCTIONS
PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTION- 
BEFORE TRIAL
Members of the jury:
Now that you have been sworn, I will give you some preliminary instructions to 
guide you in your participation in the trial.
EVIDENCE
The evidence from which you will find the facts consist of the testimony of 
witnesses, documents and other things received into the record as exhibits, and any facts 
the lawyers agree or stipulate to, or that the court may instruct you to find
Certain things are not evidence and must not be considered by you. I will list them 
for you now:
3. Statements, arguments, and questions by lawyers are not evidence.
4. Objections to questions are not evidence. Lawyers have an obligation to 
their clients to make an objection when they believe evidence being offered 
is improper under the rules of evidence. If the objection is sustained, 
ignore the question. If it is overruled, treat the answer like any other. If 
you are instructed that some item of evidence is received for a limited 
purpose only, you must follow that instruction.
5. Testimony that the court has excluded or told you to disregard is not 
evidence and must not be considered.
6. Anything you may have seen or heard outside the courtroom is not 
evidence and must be disregarded. You are to decide the case solely on the 
evidence presented here.
In the course of the trial, you are going to hear the testimony of witnesses, and you 
will have to make judgments about the credibility of the testimony. 1 ask you to be 
patient, and listen carefully to the testimony of all the witnesses, and keep it all in mind 
until you hear the entire case. As you listen to the witnesses you should take note of such 
matters as their interest or lack of interest in the outcome of the case; their ability and their 
opportunity to know and remember and tell the facts; their manner; their experience; their 
frankness and sincerity or the lack thereof; the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the 
witness’s testimony in light o f all the other evidence in the case; and any other factors that 
bear on the question of believability and weight. You should in the last analysis rely on 
your own experience, your own judgment and your own common sense.
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DUTY OF THE JURY
It will be your duty to find from the evidence what the facts are. You, and you 
alone, are the judges of the facts. You will then have to apply those facts to the law as the 
court will give it to you. You must follow that law whether you agree with it or not.
But nothing the court may say or do during the course of the trial should be taken 
by you as indicating what your verdict should be.
CONDUCT AS JURORS
Now, a few words about your conduct as jurors.
First, you should not discuss the case among yourselves or with anyone else. At 
the end of the trial, you will have as much time as you need to discuss the case. But that is 
at the end of the trial and not during the trial.
Second, do not read or listen to anything touching this case in any way. If anyone 
should try to talk to you about it, bring it to the court’s attention promptly.
Third, do not try to do any research or make any investigation about the case on 
your own.
Finally, do not form any opinion until all the evidence is in. Keep an open mind 
until you start your deliberations at the end of the case.
Members of the jury:
Now that the evidence in this case has been presented, the time has come for me to 
instruct you on the law. My instructions will cover three areas: first, some instructions on 
general rules that define and control your duties; second, the instructions that supply the 
law applicable to the claims and defenses in the case; and third, some guidelines and rules 
for your deliberations.
DUTIES OF THE JURY
In defining the duties of the jury, let me first give you a few general rules:
It is your duty to find the facts from all the evidence in the case. To the facts as 
you find them you must apply the law as I give it to you.
(POST-TRIAL INSTRUCTIONS) 
DUTIES OF JUDGE AND JURY
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The questions that you must decide will be submitted to you in the form o f a 
special verdict consisting of several questions. You must answer these questions by 
applying the facts as you may find them to be. I shall give to you the rules of law that 
apply to these questions and you must apply them in arriving at your answers. It is the 
duty of the court to order judgment according to the law and the answers you have 
returned.
You must follow the law as I give it to you, whether you agree with it or not. And 
you must do your duty as jurors regardless of any personal likes or dislikes, opinions, 
prejudices or sympathy. That means that you must decide the case solely on the evidence 
before you.
In following my instructions, you must follow all of them and not single out some 
and ignore others; they are all equally important. And you must not read into these 
instructions, or into anything the court may have said or done, any suggestion from the 
court as to what verdict you should reach.
Deciding questions of fact is your exclusive responsibility. In doing so, you must 
consider all the evidence you have heard and seen in this trial, and the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from that evidence. And you must disregard anything you may 
have heard or seen elsewhere about this case. Whether or not a particular answer is 
favorable to one party or the other should not concern you.
You must consider these instructions as a whole and regard each instruction in the 
light of all the others. The order in which the instructions are given is of no significance.
A fact may be proved by either direct or circumstantial evidence, or by both. The 
law does not prefer one form of evidence over the other.
A fact is proved by direct evidence when, for example, it is proved by witnesses 
who testily to what they saw, heard, or experienced, or by physical evidence of the fact 
itself. A fact is proved by circumstantial evidence when its existence can be reasonably 
inferred from other facts proved in the case.
In deciding the believability and weight to be given the testimony of a witness, you 
may consider:
INSTRUCTIONS TO BE 





1. Evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime. In doing so, you 
may consider whether the kind of crime committed indicates the likelihood 
of the witness telling or not telling the truth.
2. Evidence of the witness’ reputation for truthfulness.
3. Evidence of a statement by or conduct o f the witness on some prior 
occasion which is inconsistent with the witness’ present testimony. This 
evidence may be considered by you only for the purpose of testing the 
believability and weight o f the witness’ testimony and for no other purpose. 
If, however, the statement was given under oath or the witness is a party in 
this case, the evidence o f the prior inconsistent statement or the conduct of 
the party may be considered as evidence bearing on the issues in this case 
as well as for resting believability and weight.
BURDEN OF PROOF
In order to answer any question “yes”, the greater weight of the evidence must 
support such an answer, otherwise you should answer the question “no”. Greater weight 
of the evidence means that all o f the evidence by whomever produced must lead you to 
believe it is more likely that the claim is true than not true. If the evidence does not lead 
you believe it is more likely that the claim is true than not true, then the claim has not been 
proved by the greater weight o f the evidence.
The greater weight of the evidence does not necessarily mean the greater number 
of witnesses or the greater volume o f testimony. Any believable evidence may be a 
sufficient basis to prove a fact.
NEGLIGENCE AND REASONABLE C A R E - 
BASIC DEFINITION
Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care. Reasonable care is that care 
which a reasonable person would use under like circumstances. Negligence is the doing of 
something which a reasonable person would not do, or the failure to do something which a 
reasonable person would do, under like circumstances.
DIRECT CAUSE
A direct cause is a cause which had a substantial part in bringing about the injury, 
either immediately or through happenings which follow one after another.
SUPERSEDING CAUSE
However, a cause is not a direct cause when there is a superseding cause. For a 
cause to be a superseding cause it:
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APPENDIX B: NEW, PLAIN LANGUAGE JURY INSTRUCTIONS
PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS— 
BEFORE TRIAL
Members of the jury:
You have now been sworn in.
Here are some basic rules about your job as a juror.
Your job will be to find what the facts are in this case by considering the evidence.
As judge I will apply the rules and tell you what you can and cannot consider as evidence. 
What is evidence
1. Evidence is what witnesses say on the stand. This is called “testimony”.
2. Evidence can be items like photographs and documents. These items are called 
exhibits.
3. There are also facts you must accept:
a. Evidence can be facts that the attorneys agree on. This agreement is called 
a stipulation.
b. There may also be facts that I tell you to accept.
What is not evidence
The following are not evidence:
1. Nothing the attorneys say during the trial, including opening statements and 
closing arguments, is evidence.
2. The attorneys’ questions are not evidence. The witnesses’ answers are.
3. Objections are not evidence. Attorneys may object if they think a question or 
answer is against the rules:
a. I will sustain the objection if I think it is against the rules, and you should 
ignore this question or answer.
b. If I overrule the objection, the question or answer is evidence like the rest 
of the witness’s testimony.
4. You cannot consider anything you hear or learn about this case outside this 
courtroom.
You must follow the instructions on what you can consider as evidence.
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Deciding the facts
Wait until you have heard all the evidence before you make up your mind,
Your best guide is your own good judgment, experience and common sense.
In addition ask yourself:
1. Is a witness being truthful?
2. Will a witness gain or lose if this case is decided a certain way?
3. How did a witness come by the facts? How well did he or she remember the facts?
4. Does he or she seem honest and sincere?
5. Is the witness’s testimony reasonable compared with other evidence?
Duty of the Jury
You must decide the facts.
You and only you can decide the facts. Do not take anything l say or do as a sign of what 
the verdict should be.
Once the facts are decided, you must follow the law.
You must follow the law even if you don’t agree with it.
How to act as a jury member
Now a few words about your conduct as jurors:
Do not let outsiders influence you.
Do not discuss this case with other jury members during the trial.
You will have plenty of time to do this at the end of the trial, once you have all the 
evidence.
If anyone tries to discuss this case with you outside the courtroom, report this to me.
Do not read or listen to news reports about the case.
Do not do your own investigations.
Keep an open mind until you have heard or seen all of the evidence.
Remember you cannot consider anything you hear or learn about this case outside this 
courtroom.
(POST-TRIAL INSTRUCTIONS) 
DUTIES OF JUDGE AND JURY
I will give you your instructions.
The order in which I give the instructions is not important. 
Consider all the instructions together.
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You must apply the law in these instructions whether you agree with it or not.
You must follow all o f the instructions. Do not single out some and ignore others—all of 
them are equally important.
Duties of the jury and the judge
You must decide what the facts are from the evidence you have heard and seen. You 
must apply the law to these facts. I will explain which laws apply.
The questions you have to decide are listed on the verdict form. I will order a judgment 
based on your answers to the questions and the law.
It is vour exclusive duty to answer the questions on the verdict form. Do not take 
anything I do or say r~. a sign of what the answers should be.
Decide the case on the evidence
Decide the case on the evidence.
Base your decision only on the evidence you have seen or heard in this courtroom.
You must not let events outside the courtroom influence you.
Your most important duty: Be impartial
You cannot take sides based on personal likes, dislikes or prejudices.
You must not be concerned that a particular answer on the verdict form is favorable to 
one party or the other.
Here are some instructions about your deliberations and return of the verdict.
Selection of a foreperson
When you return to the jury room to discuss this case, you must select a jury member to 
be foreperson. That person will lead your deliberations.
The jurors’ duty to discuss the case
The goal o f jury deliberations is to talk among yourselves in order to reach an agreement 
about the verdict.
This agreement must be consistent with your own judgment.
Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but do so only after you have fully 
considered the views of your fellow jurors.
Re-examine your own view and change your mind, if you decide your original view was 
mistaken.
But do not change your mind just because other jurors disagree, or simply because of 
pressure to return a verdict.
DELIBERATION AND RETURN OF VERDICT
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Your verdict must be unanimous, that is: all jurors must agree on all the answers.
The foreperson must date and sign the verdict form if your verdict is unanimous. 
Divided verdict
If you cannot reach a unanimous verdict after six hours of deliberation, then five of you 
may return a verdict.
If you return a verdict that is not unanimous, the five jurors must agree to sign and date 
the jury form.
The same five jurors must agree on ail the answers.
Juror’s responsibility
You must not allow sympathy, prejudice, or emotion to influence your verdict.
The quality of your service will be reflected in the verdict you return to this court.
Your arrival at a just and proper verdict contributes to the administration of justice.
Direct and circumstantial evidence
A fact can be proved in one of two ways:
1. A fact is proved by direct evidence when that fact is proved directly without any 
inferences.
2. A fact is proved bv circumstantial evidence when that fact can be inferred from 
other facts proved in the case.
For example, the fact that “a person walked in the snow” could be proved:
1. By an eyewitness who testified directly that he or she saw a person walking in the 
snow.
2. By circumstantial evidence of shoe-prints in the snow, from which it can be 
indirectly inferred that a person had walked in the snow.
Using direct and circumstantial evidence
You should consider both kinds o f evidence. The law makes no distinction between the
weight given to either direct or circumstantial evidence.
It is up to you to decide how much weight to give any kind of evidence.
DIRECT AND
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
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You must decide what testimony to believe and how much weight to give it.
Guidelines for impeachment
1. You may consider what the witness did or said in the past, if it is not consistent 
with what he or she is saying now.
If what was said in the past was not under oath, use it only to decide the truth or 
weight of what the witness is saying now.
If it was under oath, or the witness is a party in this case, then use it to decide the 
issues in this case and the truth and weight o f what the witness is saying now.
2. You may consider whether the witness has been convicted of a crime. You may 
consider whether the kind of crime makes it more likely that he or she is not telling 
the truth.
3. You may consider a witness’s reputation for truthfulness.
Deciding the issues in a case
You will be asked to answer “yes’ or “no” to some questions on the verdict form.
The greater weight o f the evidence must support a “yes” answer.
This means that all of the evidence, regardless of which party produced it, must lead you 
to believe that the claim is more likely true than not true.
Greater weight of the evidence does not necessarily mean the greater number of witnesses 
or the greater volume of evidence.
Any believable evidence may be enough to prove that a claim is more likely true than not.
Definition of “reasonable care”
Reasonable care is the care a reasonable person would use in the same or similar 
circumstances.
Definition of “negligence”
Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care.
Ask yourself what a reasonable person would have done in these circumstances. 
Negligence occurs when a person:
1. Does something a reasonable person would not do; or
2. Fails to do something a reasonable person would do.
BURDEN OF PROOF
NEGLIGENCE AND REASONABLE C A R E - 
BASIC DEFINITION
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Definition of “direct cause”
A “direct cause” is a cause that had a substantial part in bringing about the injury.
Definition of “superseding cause”
However, a cause is not a direct cause when there is a superseding cause.
A cause is a superseding cause when four conditions are present:
1. It happened after the original negligence; and
2. It did not happen because o f the original negligence; and
3. It changed the natural course o f events and made the result different from what it 
would nave been; and
4. The original wrongdoer could not have reasonably anticipated this event.
SUPERSEDING CAUSE
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APPENDIX C: COMPREHENSION TEST
Subject number 
INSTRUCTIONS
Circle the letter corresponding to the best answer. Answer each question 
based on the tape recorded instructions you just heard.
For short essay questions, use the back of the page if more space is 
needed. Please work through the questions in order. Do not return to a 
previous question and change an answer.
1. Assume you are serving on a six-person jury. How many jurors must vote 
in favor of the plaintiff in order to return a verdict in plaintiffs favor?
Answer:_____________________________
2. Again, assume a six-person jury. How many jurors must vote in favor of 
the defendant in order to return a verdict in defendant's favor?
Answer:_____________________________
3. In a jury trial, who decides fact issues? In other words, who decides what 
events actually occurred?
Answer:
4. In a jury trial, who decides which laws apply to the case?
Answer:_________________
5. Bob is the defendant (a party) in a traffic accident case. Just after the 
accident occurred, Bob told the investigating officer that ne owned one of the 
vehicles involved. Now at trial, Bob testifies that he never owned the vehicle. 
His current testimony and his prior statement to police cannot be reconciled (in 
other words, they cannot both be true). The jury may consider Bob's statement 
to police for which of the following purpose(s)? (Circle all that apply.)
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a. To decide fact issues in the trial.
b. To decide whether Bob's current testimony is believable.
c. To decide how much weight to give Bob's current testimony.
d. None of the above.
6. At a traffic accident trial, a witness testifies that she saw the defendant 
driving his car near the location of the accident five minutes prior to the accident. 
This testimony is direct evidence that:
a. Defendant was driving a car five minutes before the accident.
b. Defendant was driving a car at the time of the accident.
c. Defendant was responsible for the accident.
d. All of the above.
7. "Greater weight of the evidence" means:
a. More than half of the jurors agree that the claim is true.
b. The jurors have an obligation to weigh all the evidence presented.
c. The evidence as a whole convinces the jury that the claim is more 
likely true than false.
d. More witnesses or documents were presented at trial in favor of the
8. The attorneys have stipulated (agreed) to a particular fact. What is the 
effect of this stipulation?
a. The jury must accept that fact as evidence in the case.
b. The jury may accept that fact as evidence in the case.
c. The fact has been placed in dispute and both sides will present 
evidence about it.
d. The judge has ruled that the fact exists as a matter of law.
9. What are the most important instructions given by the judge?
a. The ones presented first.
b. The ones that best explain the evidence.
c. The ones describing what each party must prove.
d. All instructions are equally important.
10. In order to answer "yes" to a claim on the verdict form, the jury must 
believe that:
a. The claim is more likely true than not true.
b. The claim has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
c. No believable evidence was presented against the claim.
d. The plaintiff is entitled to receive money in the lawsuit.
11. During questioning of a witness, the other side's attorney makes an 
objection to the question. If the objection is sustained, the jury should:
claim than against it.
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a. Treat both the attorney's question and the witness' answer as 
evidence.
b. Treat the witness' answer as evidence, but not the attorney's 
question.
c. Disregard both the question and the answer.
d. Disregard the witness' entire testimony.
12. "Evidence" may consist of: (circle ajl that apply)
a. testimony of witnesses
b. exhibits
c. documents
d. closing arguments of attorneys
e. jury instructions given by the judge
13. Mark is testifying at trial. His testimony contradicts a prior unsworn 
statement he made before the trial began. Mark is not a party at this trial. The 
jury may consider Mark's prior statement for which purpose(s)? (Circle aj| that 
apply.)
a. To decide fact issues in the trial.
b. To decide whether Mark's current testimony is believable.
c. To decide how much weight to give Mark's current testimony.
d. None of the above.
14. You are a juror in a negligence trial. You believe both of the following 
facts:
1. A reasonable person would have acted differently than the 
defendant did.
2. The defendant believed he was being reasonable and careful. 
Will you vote to find the defendant negligent?
a. Yes
b. No
15. In deciding whether a particular witness is believable, a juror may 
consider evidence presented by other witnesses.
a. True
b. False
16. Prior to the close (end) of evidence, a juror may discuss the case, but 




17. Al! statements of the witnesses, attorneys, and judge made during the trial 
are to be considered as evidence.
a. True
b. False




19. If the jury decides that some of the judge's instructions do not apply to the 
case, they should ignore those instructions and obey the rest.
a. True
b. False
20. During the course of a trial, it is the civic duty of jurors to gather 
information about the case from news reports.
a. True
b. False
21. The jury must ignore any attempt to discredit a witness by showing bad 
reputation for truthfulness or honesty.
a. True
b. False
22. A cause is a superseding cause if it arises as a natural and foreseeable 
result of the original wrongdoing.
a. True
b. False
23. When answering questions on the verdict form, jurors should consider the 
effect that their answers will have on each party.
a, True
b. False
24. In deciding whether to believe a witness, the jury may consider that the 
witness has been convicted of a crime.
a. True
b. False
25. On a scale of 0 (absolutely sure that the claim is false) to 100 (absolutely 
sure that the claim is true), how convinced must a juror be in order to vote "yes" 




split, with the evidence for the claim being equal to the evidence against the 
claim.)
Answer: _______________
26. Under what circumstances may a verdict be non-unanimous (that is, not 
all jurors agree)?
Answer:____________________ ___
27. What is “direct evidence”? 
Answer:___________________
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APPENDIX D: DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE
Subject number Jury Instruction Study 
DemograpI ic Questionnaire
Please provide the following information about yourself. List or circle the correct answer.
1 Age: _____
2. Sex: Male Female
3. Year in school:
Freshman Sophomore Junior Senior Grad/Prof. Other
4. Have you decided on a college major? Yes No
If so, what is i t ? ____________________________________
If you have a minor, what is i t ? ________________________
5. Please list any jobs you hold or have held in the past. If you have had many jobs, please list the 
most significant ones. Be sure to include any law-related jobs, such as v/orking in a lawyer’s 
office.
6. What is your native language? ___________________________
7. Have you received any legal training (on-the-job, school coursework, etc.)? Yes No
If so, please describe the training you received. List any school courses you have taken 
that relate to the law.
8. Have you ever served on a jury? Yes No
If so, please indicate whether the case(s) were civil or criminal, and briefly describe each 
case. If you served as foreperson, please indicate so.
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